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BACKGROUND:  Over the past fifteen years,
USAID and other donors have made considerable
investments in African technology development
and transfer (TDT) activities, primarily for re-
search and extension.  Yet obligations for TDT
under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) THE IMPACTS OF INVESTMENTS IN
declined steadily from $55 million in 1986 to $35 AGRICULTURAL TDT 
million in 1991, reflecting a decrease in the pro-
portion of the DFA allocated to agricultural TDT
from 34 percent of the allocation to all agricultural
activities in 1986 to 14 percent in 1991.
This dramatic decrease in USAID funding for
TDT stemmed in part from perceptions that TDT
has had little impact.  These perceptions were
based on gloomy aggregate statistics, such as
stagnant per capita food production in Africa,
which  resulted from high population growth rates,
war, drought, and other factors in addition to
TDT.  The perceptions were also based on
examples of real problems that agricultural
research and extension organizations faced.
To inform TDT investment decisions, USAID
commissioned a set of studies to measure the
people-level impacts of TDT in sub-Saharan
Africa, as well as the accomplishments of TDT in
achieving national-level impacts.  Results from
these and other relevant impact assessments were
reported at the Symposium on the Impact of Tech-
nology in Sub-Saharan Africa held on Oct. 14-16,
1992, in Washington, D.C.
A primary purpose of the symposium was to pre-
sent evidence that would either confirm or contra-
dict the perception that the accomplishments of
TDT were insufficient to justify continued fund-
ing.  A secondary objective was to consider the
adequacy of available methods of impact assess-
ment.  The objective of the current report is to
summarize and interpret the symposium results.
The Rate of Return (ROR) Method of Impact
Assessment:  TDT is a process characterized by
four sequential stages:  creation of the institutional
capacity to develop improved techniques of pro-
duction, expansion of the technology frontier,
transfer of technology to users, and sustainable
changes in long-term productivity.
The rate of return (ROR) is the most commonly
used measure of the economic profitability of
TDT investments. This measure summarizes the
benefits, costs and time frame of the activity.
Investments with positive RORs give benefits that
more than cover costs.  Investments with RORs
that exceed the return to alternative investments or
the cost of obtaining funds are considered
economically  profitable.  The benefits included in
the appraisal of TDT investments are usually
people-level benefits such as changes in income or
other measures of household welfare.
There are several other accomplishments of TDT
that are not often counted as benefits, due to diffi-
culties in quantifying the impact.  These accom-
plishments include improvements in the status of
women within the household, improvements in the
environment and the sustainability of agricultural
production, improvements in the human and
institutional capacity for research, and improve
ments in equity (income distribution).  The ROR 
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 TABLE 1. EX POST ROR STUDIES OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL TDT.





Abidogun 1982 Nigeria Cocoa -    42
Makau 1984 Kenya Wheat 1924-74  33





Karanja 1990 Kenya Maize 1955-1988 40-60
Mazzucato









1992 Senegal Cowpea 1981-1986 31-92
Sterns & Bernsten
b 1992 Cameroon Cowpea 1979-1992   3
Howard et al.
b 1992 Zambia Maize 1978-1991  < 0, 90-103
c
Laker-Ojok










 Parameters estimated for 1955-1988; ROR for research undertaken in 1978.   USAID-commissioned studies
a                    b
 Including and excluding real costs of maize program subsidies, respectively.
c
studies  presented in the symposium do not ac- Alternative  interpretations  of  the  consistently  high
count directly for these other benefits, although estimated RORs were examined during sympo-
evidence of progress in these areas was reported in sium presentations and discussions.  For example,
some studies. if ROR studies focus primarily on success stories,
ROR Assessment Results:  Table 1 shows results
for a set of ex post studies, i.e., those analyzing
TDT benefits achieved to date.  In general, the
RORs are not only positive but also high enough
to indicate economic profitability.  These findings
are striking. They provide a direct contrast to the
negative views of African agricultural research
impacts that have permeated recent discussions.
In the current set of studies, only Niger and
Uganda show ex post RORs that are negative.
The remainder of the studies find positive returns,
ranging from 3 percent for cowpea in Cameroon
to 135 percent for maize in Mali.  Examined as a
group, the estimated RORs support the proposi-
tion that African agricultural research has had
people-level impacts large enough to justify the
level of investment that led to the impacts.
the reported results are biased upward.  The coun-
tries and commodities in the USAID-sponsored
studies  were chosen to avoid any such bias.  Cases
of likely TDT successes (e.g., Kenyan maize) were
examined, as well as cases where conventional
wisdom said that little impact had been achieved
(e.g., Niger).  The countries included in the MSU
study constitute a stratified random sample,
although the crops were chosen based on their
importance to the food system and/or the priorities
of the AID missions, national agricultural research
systems, and Ministries of Agriculture.  Regional
evidence  (Evenson,  1987) relating measures of
productivity to measures of all research funding,
including successes and failures, also shows large
positive RORs. Thus, biased selection is not a
likely explanation of the ROR results. 











Kenya YES NO NO NO
Niger YES YES YES
a YES
b
Senegal YES YES YES
a,c YES
d
Cameroon YES YES NO YES
d
Zambia YES YES YES
e YES
b
Mali YES YES YES
a NO
  Costs of providing farm-level inputs.    Institution building.    Costs of degree training.    Sensitivity analysis included food
a            b      c          d
security benefits.   Farm input costs plus real costs of maize program subsidies.
e
Table 2.  Components of TDT by Study.
The ROR studies were undertaken from the per costs would probably be included, reducing the
spective of national research systems.  The report- estimated ROR, as in the Mali case.
ed RORs therefore represent the returns to invest-
ment  in  national  research  programs,  taking  as Second, in most cases, it is difficult or impossible
given the contribution of the international agricul- to identify the impact of a given component of
tural research centers (IARCs). TDT, such as research or extension.  Table 2 sum-
A Comparison of Methodologies Used:  While
each of the MSU ROR studies used the same con-
ceptual background in assessing benefits and
costs, the investigator's decisions about data col-
lection, the scope of the study, and other critical
variables varied somewhat from country to coun-
try.  These issues and their effect on the estimated
RORs are discussed in the next section.
First, for young TDT systems such as those in
Africa, many projects have continuing impacts.
Impact assessments are sensitive to the starting
and ending points chosen by the evaluator.
A young research program may just be starting to
have impacts, with the bulk of the impacts to
come in the future.  An assessment of impacts Factors Influencing Impact:  An important part
only through the present therefore will not capture of the impact assessment story is the analysis of
any benefits of future use of improved crop or factors that had a positive or negative effect on the
livestock varieties or management practices.  Ig- impact of TDT. Insights from this analysis help
noring likely future benefits may lead to an unpro- suggest how future TDT programs could be better
fitable or negative ROR, as in the Niger and designed or implemented.  Five major factors
Uganda cases.  Similarly, if the starting point of emerged from the studies presented, and from
the analysis is extended backwards in time, per- comments by symposium participants.
haps because the project being evaluated is the
second phase of an earlier activity, additional
marizes the components of TDT that are consider-
ed by each of the AID-commissioned studies.
A third complication is that some benefits are dif-
ficult to quantify.  For example, benefits of insti-
tution building and improvements in seasonal food
security are discussed but not estimated mon-
etarily in most of the studies (Table 2, last
column).  Another benefit often not quantified is
any reduction in consumer prices resulting from
increased production or marketing efficiency.
Such benefits to consumers are particularly impor-
tant for the poorest farmers, who are often net
purchasers of food.  Hence lower prices are likely
to improve equity, and to increase the estimated
ROR (when consumer benefits are included).  
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Policies affecting the supply and price of agricul- Appropriate priorities, scientific leadership, favor-
tural inputs, and the market for and the price of able incentives, and adequate human and financial
agricultural outputs, clearly have an effect on im- resources are needed if research systems are to be
pact of improved technology.  A dramatic example effective in generating improved technology.
is Zambia, where government policy stimulated  a Several country studies (e.g., Zambia, Kenya,
degree of improved maize adoption that appears Cameroon) showed that a combination of well-
to have been economically unprofitable as well as funded programs by national and international re-
budgetarily unsustainable.  In Sudan, the adoption search centers and donor agencies did result in the
of improved sorghum suffered a set-back when release of improved technology that was adopted
government pricing policy changed. by farmers. Maintaining productive research sys-
Input supplies (including seed and credit) and out- donor involvement requires more rigorous prior-
put markets play a key role in supporting or re- ity-setting (maintaining adequate funding for few-
straining adoption of productivity-increasing agri- er research programs) and changes in the incentive
cultural technology.  Lack of effective improved structure (salary,  merit-based  researcher  evalu-
seed multiplication and distribution was a critical ation  procedures)  within  national  agricultural
constraint in Uganda and Niger, as was lack of research  systems.
fertilizer in Zambia.  Limited markets for output
were constraints in Mali and Uganda.  By con-
trast, wide use of improved maize hybrids in
Zambia was encouraged by relatively effective
input and output markets.
Many of the TDT programs evaluated in the im-
pact studies were implemented in zones with dif-
ficult agroclimatic conditions.  The Niger and
Cameroon  TDT programs faced a challenge in try-
ing to develop improved cereal and cowpea tech-
nology for areas with low and variable rainfall.
Droughts also reduced impact in Niger.  Diversity
of agroclimatic conditions within the zone targeted
by research also presents problems because of the
drop in performance of an improved technology
outside the area for which it was designed.  The
Zambia maize study showed, for example, that
improved hybrids or varieties were adopted by
two-thirds of farmers in the best maize zone, but
by only one-third of farmers in the less favorable
(low-rainfall) zone.  Also, farmers in the best
maize zone planted three-quarters of their land in
improved maize, compared to one-quarter in the
low-rainfall zone.
Research organizations, and other institutions
needed  for effective TDT, depend on a stable poli-
tical environment.  The Uganda study illustrates
the cost of restoring the institutional framework
destroyed by civil unrest.
tem performance with tighter budgets and reduced
CONCLUSION:  Given the importance of rais-
ing productivity in agriculture as a step towards
agricultural transformation, continued investment
in agricultural TDT is merited.  The evidence of
impact achieved from previous investments, and
the evidence of beneficial changes in the macro-
economic policy environment in many countries,
provide the basis for expecting that future invest-
ments will pay off.  The evaluation results indicate
that USAID may wish to maintain or gradually in-
crease the amount of funding allocated to agricul-
tural technology development and transfer in sub-
Saharan Africa.
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